Peace With Syria First

By any Israeli geopolitical and strategic configuration, Syria remains the key to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. No one understands this premise better that Prime Minister Sharon. Sharon is savvy enough to know that, even if he were successful in achieving a permanent peace with the Palestinians, he will have to quickly turn his full attention to the Syrian track. Syria will not sit idle and wait for Sharon or his successor to voluntarily deliver the Golan. Syria will deny Israel and the rest of the Arab world the fruit of peace by instigating violence throughout the region. Given the deterioration in Israeli-Palestinian relations, the question that faces Sharon is whether or not it would be more compelling strategically and more advantageous from a negotiating vantage to reach out to Syria first.

The Israelis have expressed their utter rejection of violence and blame former Prime Minister Barak for mishandling the negotiations with the Palestinians. The trust between the Israelis and the Palestinians has been shattered, and a respite from negotiation will provide a healthy dose of time for both sides to reassess what went wrong, why, and on what basis they should they resume negotiations in order to improve the chances for success. Sharon's precondition of total cessation of violence, and Arafat's insistence on restarting negotiations where they were left off, may render the prospect for a quick resumption of negotiations most unlikely.

Compared to the many daunting, emotionally charged and complicated issues involved in negotiation with the Palestinians — the future status of Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees, the Israeli settlements, and final borders– the discord with Syria is simpler to settle and will yield far-reaching geopolitical and strategic implications. From the mid-nineties, under the premierships of Rabin, Peres, Natanyahu, and Barak, polls have consistently shown that as long as the government delivers a normal and full peace with Syria, with iron-clad security arrangements, the Israelis will choose the path of peace even if it means a total withdrawal from the Golan Heights and a complete relocation of the settlers. A Gallup poll, commissioned by the independent Israeli newspaper Maarive, few days before the negotiations were suspended in early January 2000, indicated that most Israelis (67 percent) support going ahead with Syrian peace.

Sharon's views on the conditions for peace with Syria obviously differ from those held by Barak and his predecessors. Only a few days before the negotiations with Syria were suspended, in an op-ed article published on December 28, 1999 in The New York Times entitled "Why Should Israel Reward Syria?" Sharon rejects the proposition of full withdrawal for full peace. He makes a number of cogent points to clarify why Israel cannot withdraw from the Golan, suggesting that Syria needs peace just as much as Israel does, and, therefore, it will simply have to accept peace for peace. My understanding is that Sharon's position on the Golan has not changed much since he wrote his article. For this reason, I believe it is necessary to review the points he made and provide a balanced counter argument to show that a normal peace with Syria requires full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan.

To begin with, Sharon asserts that "Given the nondemocratic, authoritarian character of the Syrian regime and the unpredictability of what might take place in Syria after Hafez al-Asad is no longer in power, an Israeli agreement to return to the 1967 borders could cause it to end up with neither peace nor the Golan Heights." Certainly there are some legitimate concerns about the potential for political instability in Syria. Asad's son, the successor, seems to be committed to agreements made in the name of his father. Holding onto the Golan because of Syrian political unpredictably, however, is like putting on blinders and then complaining about not being able to see. Based on Israel's experience with Asad the father since the disengagement agreement of 1974, there is every reason to believe that his son will also, follow scrupulously an accord with Israel." Indeed, what will make that outcome more likely is if the agreement is fair and equitable. Successive leaders on both sides will not need to justify such an accord, and they will also have vested interests in its preservation. It is an accepted axiom nowadays that no Syrian leader could defend only a partial Israeli withdrawal in exchange for "a normal and comprehensive peace," and that no Israeli leader could justify full withdrawal for anything less than full peace.

Whereas peace provides the ultimate security, Israel will still maintain a formidable military power along with multiple safety valves and security arrangements that will make the reversal of peace counterproductive and therefore unlikely. Future Syrian leaders, be they despots or democratically elected, would have to be insane to trade peace and prosperity for a military adventure that would most certainly destroy their country. In any event, the potential for the rise of a despot who will reject the peace exists in Egypt and Jordan too. Yet this possibility did not prevent Israel from making peace with these two states. The protagonists against withdrawal from Syria conveniently forget that.

The second point that Sharon makes is that "Most foreign defense experts and senior United States army officers who have visited the Golan Heights or studied it repeat the categorical opinion that even in the missile age it is impossible to defend Israel effectively against a ground attack without military control of the Golan Heights." These arguments remain valid as long as Syria is unwilling to make peace. However, under conditions of full and sustainable peace, many Israeli Army generals, including former chiefs of the General Staff, Don Shomron, and Barak attest that the Golan becomes much less relevant. In fact, if Syria is ready and willing to deliver the peace that Israel wants, and the Israelis refuse to offer full withdrawal in return to meet the Syrians' condition, the Golan will no longer be a security asset but a liability. Indeed, what incentive would the Syrians have to keep the status quo of no peace and no war? Another war– if only to destabilize the political climate and possibly wreck Israel's peace efforts with the Palestinians, Egypt and Jordan — would be too tempting and probably only a matter of time.

The third point that Sharon makes is that "No country, including the United States, has ever given up territory and strategic depth just because it had advanced weapons systems or sophisticated early warning technology." To suggest that no territory has ever been given back is simply incorrect. Since the end of World War II, the acquisition of territory through the use of force has become inadmissible and is inconsistent with the international norm of conduct. Israel has had to withdraw from the entire Sinai, which deprived it of strategic depth in return for peace. To compensate for that, Israel has built with the help of the U.S. Two major air basis and further fortified its air defenses in the south but relied mostly on the conditions of peace between Israel and Egypt. In relation to Syria, there is perhaps some justification for concerned because of Syria's past recalcitrant behavior and the Golan's proximity to Israel heartland. A country which that has extolled the virtues of Israel's destruction for four decades, obviously rouses to the Israeli public distrust. The question is, however, what's the alternative? Does Sharon really believe that Israel can make peace with Syria while retaining the Golan? In his article he argues that "Successive American administrations have been committed to the principle in President Ford's 1975 letter to Rabin backing Israel stance that any peace agreement be predicated on Israel's remaining on the Golan Heights." This obviously is not an accurate statement since the U.S. has consistently supported U.N. Resolution 242 which called upon Israel to return territories captured (in the Six Day War 1967) in exchange for peace and secure borders. Both peace treaties between Israel – Egypt and Israel – Jordan were predicated on U.N. Resolution 242. There is not a single compelling reason why should Syria accept anything less. To put it bluntly, it is a highly dangerous illusion to suggest that Israel can have it both ways – peace and the Golan. Four former Israeli prime ministers — Rabin, Peres, Natanyahu and Barak — thought they could exchange peace for peace with Syria, but they all came to realize that only full withdrawal from the Golan can bring peace. This is a reality that Sharon too will have to face.

The fourth point that Sharon makes in his article is that "Israel…must insist that if it is to give up the defensive asset of the Golan, there must be not only a demilitarized zone on the Golan, but also a reduction of Syria's armed forces and the number of its missiles, and a dismantling of its arsenal of chemical warfare." There have been extensive discussions over security matters between Israel and Syria. Many of Israel's security requirements have been agreed to. Barak was directly involved in the security negotiations with the Syrians in November and December of 1994 and in January 2000. He is, therefore, completely aware that the negotiations reached agreements on most of these security issues. Although much progress was made, Syria insisted all along that any security arrangements must be equal, balanced, and mutual; that the security of one side cannot come at the expense of the other; and that arrangements on both sides must take into account the geographic features of the land. The question of demilitarization was basically resolved, provided that Israel offers a credible reduction of its military readiness in the north. The question of monitors was also settled if U.S. or, U.S. dominated forces do the monitoring along with air and space surveillance to provide real time data insuring full compliance by both sides to any agreement. Other more complicated security issues, including weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and general reduction in armed forces were agreed in principle to defer for a later discussion. The problems associated with both countries' possession of weapons mass destruction are not limited to bilateral conflict; they also have strategic regional implications. Both sides continue to be threatened by dangerous adversaries: Israel is threatened by Iraq, Iran, and Lybia; Syria, notwithstanding a temporary thaw in its relations with Iraq, feels encircled by staunch enemies including Iraq and Turkey. For this reason, officials from both sides recognized in earlier negotiation that discussion about these weapons, as a crucial as it may be, must be tackled outside the current negotiating framework. Once an agreement has been attained on all other issues, particularly total withdrawal and normalization of relations, a regional security committee will be formed to review the entire spectrum of issues pertaining to these weapons.

On the questions of reduction of Syrian armed forces and the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon these and other security matter remain subject to further discussion and were all incorporated in the paper Aims and Principles of Security Arrangement which Israel and Syria agreed to in May 1995.

The fifth point that Sharon makes is that "The United States will not rearm Syria with advance Western weapons after an agreement is reached. Such rearming would erode the Israeli ability to deter attack and cancel the Israeli qualitative edge in weaponry the United States has pledged to maintain." The United States commitment to maintain Israel's military edge remains as valid today as it has ever been. President Bush reiterated that pledge again, and it would be highly unlikely that the U.S. would do anything to undermine Israel's military superiority which is part of America's long- term strategic interest in the region. But if Syria needs to modernize its military, would it not be better for Israel if the United States were involved in that modernization effort rather than, say, Russia or France? With military assistance comes American presence and American influence. At the present, Egypt and many other Arab states are recipients of American military assistance and military hardware and the close relations between the U.S. and these Arab countries enhance regional stability and stifle adventurism, especially against another American ally.

The sixth point that Sharon articulates in his article is that "Israel must have control of its water resources, which are of great long-term importance in an arid region where there are already shortages. A third of Israel's water flows from the Golan and could be diverted there, and it must continue to have presence near these water sources." Syria has recognized all along Israel's need for water and has consistently maintained the position that water distribution and future protection of these sources is subject to negotiation. But if Sharon is alluding to a permanent Israeli presence on Syrian soil, it is simply unacceptable to Damascus. The Syrians have always argued against any Israeli presence, be it in the form of early warning stations or soldiers monitoring water supplies. A Syrian diplomat involved in the negotiations rejects such an Israeli presence arguing that: (a) no security or water arrangement should compromise the territorial integrity of either side. ("We do not want to have a Syrian early warning station in Israel and we will not allow an Israeli one on our territory"); (b) tactically, an early warning station could be used for other purposes which could undermine the security of his country; and (c) the need for supplies will create a logistical problem that the Syrians simply are unwilling to put up with. The most compelling objection, however, is that for the Syrians an Israeli early warning station or any type of Israeli presence is a symbol of occupation and a permanent reminder of national humiliation. For Israel, there may be no real substitute for the psychological comfort that an Israeli presence on the Golan provides. But military experts agree that any future water arrangement would necessarily require extensive cooperation involving daily contacts between the two sides. As for Israeli security concerns, there are several viable alternatives to early warning stations including air and space surveillance.

Finally, Sharon raises the problem of the settlers: "It (Israel) is also being asked to bear the painful cost of transferring 18,000 of its own citizens and uprooting 33 communities, deepening already dangerous division in Israeli society. All this for what is at best an uncertain nonbelligerency agreement?" Sharon, like many other Israelis opposed to the withdrawal, invokes the presence of Jewish settlers on the Golan as one of the main reasons not to relinquish the plateau. But should Sharon who is genuinely concerned about "deepening already dangerous division in Israeli society," forfeit an historic opportunity for a comprehensive peace so that the Golan's residents remain, thereby subjecting the whole country to a perpetual state of war and endless sacrifices? As pioneers, the settlers have already played a critical role in convincing the Syrians that only genuine peace might remove them from the Golan. As painful and heartbreaking as their evacuation will be, it must viewed in the context of other alternatives. Rabin was correct when he bluntly stated, referring to then opposition leader Natanyahu, that "It is a deception to argue that Israel can have peace with Syria while holding onto the entire Golan Heights." Barak certainly shares these sentiments, and he too came to the conclusion, even before he became prime minister, that without evacuating the Golan there will no peace with Syria.

One critical issue that Sharon did not discuss in his article is Israel's requirements for normalization of relations under any peace formula. No Israeli prime minister should relinquish the Golan for anything less than full and normal peace. Sharon would be right not to exchange the Golan for a mere "nonbelligerency agreement." More than any other security measure, normalization of relations can create a mutually vested interest in keeping the peace. The Syrians were initially reluctant to offer Israel normal relations, maintaining that it is up to each country to extend the kind of relations it wants, as long as they are not adversarial or hostile. However, Syria came around, through the negotiating process, to appreciate the Israeli position. An agreement between the two governments is obviously a critically important first step, but it will remain hollow if it is not translated into people-to-people relations and honored on a daily basis. What will give such agreement a life and vitality is trade, commerce, tourism, cultural exchange, regional cooperation, mutual investments, and, of course, diplomatic relations. The more extensive and transparent these exchanges are, the more beneficial and enduring the peace agreement becomes. During the on-and-off negotiations between the two parties, there was a definite understanding on most major issues regarding normalization as long as there was a correlation between the timetable of full withdrawal, and the pace of the normalization agreed upon by both sides.

Sharon, who has dedicated every minute of his adult life to the welfare and well being of his country and people, may after all seize an historic opportunity and deliver what his predecessors could not. As committed as he may be to the idea of keeping the strategic Heights under Israeli control, Sharon is also a pragmatic leader who wants to redeem himself by ushering in a new era and bringing peace to his beleaguered nation. In points four and five he clearly alludes to the possibility of withdrawing from the Golan under certain security arrangements. Indeed, there are clearly several salient advantages to turning north and offering to make peace with Syria. First, far fewer Israelis feel an emotional attachment to the Golan stronger than their attachment to the West Bank. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of Israelis are emotionally tired and psychologically handicapped by an abnormal state of hostile existence. National security has become a national obsession. The way Israelis think, plan, and act is framed by the uncertainty that Israel's enemies and the potential for another war impose. The majority of people want to change the national psyche from this state of constant tension and anxiety, which has sapped much of the national energy, to a state of emotional and psychological comfort that builds on confidence and hope. Only a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, to which Syria holds the key, will give the Israelis what they have longed for over a period of two generations. Second, peace with Syria will end, for all intents and purposes, the century-old Israeli-Arab bloodshed and hostilities. A peace with Syria will virtually neutralize most terrorist groups throughout the Middle East, and completely diminish the prospect of another Arab-Israeli war. It will isolate Israel's remaining enemies, such as Iran and Iraq, and prevent them from posing a serious future threat to Israel. Israel has never been in a stronger position, economically or militarily, to take a calculated risk for an historic peace. This prospect offers the Israelis a momentous opportunity to rise above their fears and trust themselves.

Third, peace with Syria will allow Israel to re-channel its national resources and energy toward allocating more money for education, infrastructure, health care and social welfare instead of spending billions of dollars annually on military preparedness to remain combat-ready for the next war. Although Israel will have to maintain a formidable military power in the post Israeli-Syrian peace era, young Israelis, as indicated by former prime minister Barak, could be enlisted in the armed forces for a shorter period of time. This will add millions of productive man-hours to the civilian sector from which both the individual and the state will benefit enormously. Fourth, it is not an exaggeration to suggest that peace between Israel and the rest of the Arab world will become vital, alive and mutually rewarding only with Syria in the peace fold. Without Syria it will, at best, remain cold and lame. Israel will be denied an historic opportunity to reach out to the rest of the Arab world. Instead of establishing trade as well as commercial and cultural ties with Arab and Muslim countries from north Africa to south east Asia, Israel will be rejected and further isolated. Renewed tension with Syria is bound to dramatically slow the flow of capital to Israel. Peace, on the other hand, could make Israel a regional financial center, one of the major economic powers in a global economy. No one understands this better than Israel's business community.

Fifth, Israeli-Syrian peace will inevitably further enhance American-Israeli ties and raise strategic/military cooperation to a new level. The United States has invested heavily in Israel's economic and security needs. In the process, Israel has become a major military power and a critical ally to the United States. Peace with Syria will further enhance a U.S. – Israel strategic partnership, while bringing nearly all of the Arab states into the American orbit. This will change the dynamics of American strategy in the Middle East as well as the future well-being and national security of Israel. The Israelis are too savvy politically to forfeit such a chance.

Sixth, in the absence of peace with Syria, Damascus will be pushed further to create alliances with Iran and even with its perpetual enemy Iraq. Following his father's initiative, the Syrian president is mending his relations with Saddam Hussein and proceeding with the opening of the border for trade with Iraq and the reopening of the oil pipeline from Iraq, closed since the Gulf War. It will be to both Israel's and America's strategic detriment in the region if a new Syria-Irani-Iraqi axis is formed with the view to contain and undermine the Israel-Turkish military alliance that the United States supports. The young Asad is working hard to strengthen his relationship with Russia with the intention of further modernizing his military machine. And while he is talking about peace, he is preparing militarily for every eventuality, which explains the developing of closer military ties with Iran. Peace with Syria will bring Damascus squarely into the American sphere and seriously undermine Israeli and

American adversaries in the region. Finally, peace with Syria will almost automatically pave the way for a peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon. Since Israel withdrew its forces in the summer of 2000 from southern Lebanon, which was certified by United Nations and affirmed by Syria, no major discord left to be settled between Israel and Lebanon. Peace with Lebanon will also end future hostilities between Israel and the Party of God (Hizballah) whose future activity will be political in nature and in conformity with Damascus' wishes.

Bashar el-Asad knows that peace with Israel is not a luxury but a necessity of critical importance to Syria's national well-being. A man educated in the West, who appreciates globalization, knows that he cannot usher Syria into the 21st century while maintaining a state of war with a powerful neighbor and spending more than 50 percent of the national budget on the military. Asad also knows that Sharon cannot offer full withdrawal unless he can deliver full peace with security to his people, and Sharon should know that Asad will not offer anything resembling peace unless he recovers the entire Golan. It is now Sharon's responsibility to tell the Israeli public the truth: (a) that the Golan would not represent a "mortal danger" to Israel under conditions of peace with security, (b) that no peace is possible with Syria without the surrender of the entire Golan, and (c) that Israel's national security depends on normal peace, not on a territory.

Since full withdrawal represents the greater risk to Israel's national security and it is sine qua non for Syria to offer normal peace in return, all security arrangements will rest on the premise of a total Israeli withdrawal with only minor border modifications. As a result direct American involvement is imperative. Historically, no Israeli-Syrian agreement — or, for that matter, any Israeli-Arab agreement– has been achieved without active U.S. involvement. Today, too, no power that both the Israelis and the Syrians trust is better suited or more strategically situated than the United States to become part of the solution. The Bush administration must become a partner in the peace process, the implementation of the peace agreement, and its maintenance. Without such direct American involvement, it is doubtful an agreement can be reached because, in the end, what will separate Israel from Syria is primarily a long-term security arrangement only the U.S. can mitigate.

In earlier mediating efforts in the Middle East, American involvement included major financial assistance. We must continue to recognize that economic security is the pillar on which the national security of Israel and Syria Ð and, therefore, the durability of a meaningful peace Ð rests. Syria will need billions of dollars in economic aid, new capital, investment, and technological assistance so that ordinary Syrians can reap the dividends of peace. As for Israel, it can be expected to ask for billions of dollars in both outright assistance or, at a minimum; in loan guarantees to defray the cost of relocating 18,000 settlers from the Golan, projected at upwards of $10 billion.

Yes, America's price tag for an Israeli-Syrian peace will be hefty, both in term of its security role and its financial commitments. But we can ill afford to do less in a region where we have already invested heavily (time, human resources, money) and where our vital strategic interests are deeply entwined with the political stability and economic prosperity of our friends and allies in the region. As Israel and Syria get down to business, Syria will have to accept a phased withdrawal for no less than a two year period. During this period, the settlers will be relocated to Israel proper while Israeli forces withdraw in a number of phases to the 4 June, 1967 line or there about. As Israel implements the first phased withdrawal, the process of normalization of relations between the two countries will begin. The progress of normalization will be consistent with the agreed-upon schedule of Israeli withdrawal. All security arrangements will be implemented in accordance with an agreed-upon plan. And finally, upon completion of the Israeli withdrawal, full diplomatic relations will be established between the two nations.

Perhaps through an historic fluke or by providence Ariel Sharon has become Prime Minister of Israel at this unique juncture in the life of his nation. Sharon, who has lived through the agonies and tragic losses of every war Israel has fought, is best positioned to deliver his people from the bondage of the past 52 years. Peace with Syria could fulfill the promise of a comprehensive and lasting peace.

While Israel's newly elected Prime Minister Ariel Sharon enjoys an unprecedented mandate to seek peace with security, he should focus first on achieving a peace accord with Syria. Peace with Syria will not only be much easier to conclude than an accord with the Palestinians, but will create an environment far more conducive to reaching a final peace agreement with the Palestinians.

By any Israeli geopolitical and strategic configuration, Syria remains the key to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. No one understands this premise better that Prime Minister Sharon. Sharon is savvy enough to know that, even if he were successful in achieving a permanent peace with the Palestinians, he will have to quickly turn his full attention to the Syrian track. Syria will not sit idle and wait for Sharon or his successor to voluntarily deliver the Golan. Syria will deny Israel and the rest of the Arab world the fruit of peace by instigating violence throughout the region. Given the deterioration in Israeli-Palestinian relations, the question that faces Sharon is whether or not it would be more compelling strategically and more advantageous from a negotiating vantage to reach out to Syria first.

The Israelis have expressed their utter rejection of violence and blame former Prime Minister Barak for mishandling the negotiations with the Palestinians. The trust between the Israelis and the Palestinians has been shattered, and a respite from negotiation will provide a healthy dose of time for both sides to reassess what went wrong, why, and on what basis they should they resume negotiations in order to improve the chances for success. Sharon's precondition of total cessation of violence, and Arafat's insistence on restarting negotiations where they were left off, may render the prospect for a quick resumption of negotiations most unlikely.

Compared to the many daunting, emotionally charged and complicated issues involved in negotiation with the Palestinians — the future status of Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees, the Israeli settlements, and final borders– the discord with Syria is simpler to settle and will yield far-reaching geopolitical and strategic implications. From the mid-nineties, under the premierships of Rabin, Peres, Natanyahu, and Barak, polls have consistently shown that as long as the government delivers a normal and full peace with Syria, with iron-clad security arrangements, the Israelis will choose the path of peace even if it means a total withdrawal from the Golan Heights and a complete relocation of the settlers. A Gallup poll, commissioned by the independent Israeli newspaper Maarive, few days before the negotiations were suspended in early January 2000, indicated that most Israelis (67 percent) support going ahead with Syrian peace.

Sharon's views on the conditions for peace with Syria obviously differ from those held by Barak and his predecessors. Only a few days before the negotiations with Syria were suspended, in an op-ed article published on December 28, 1999 in The New York Times entitled "Why Should Israel Reward Syria?" Sharon rejects the proposition of full withdrawal for full peace. He makes a number of cogent points to clarify why Israel cannot withdraw from the Golan, suggesting that Syria needs peace just as much as Israel does, and, therefore, it will simply have to accept peace for peace. My understanding is that Sharon's position on the Golan has not changed much since he wrote his article. For this reason, I believe it is necessary to review the points he made and provide a balanced counter argument to show that a normal peace with Syria requires full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan.

To begin with, Sharon asserts that "Given the nondemocratic, authoritarian character of the Syrian regime and the unpredictability of what might take place in Syria after Hafez al-Asad is no longer in power, an Israeli agreement to return to the 1967 borders could cause it to end up with neither peace nor the Golan Heights." Certainly there are some legitimate concerns about the potential for political instability in Syria. Asad's son, the successor, seems to be committed to agreements made in the name of his father. Holding onto the Golan because of Syrian political unpredictably, however, is like putting on blinders and then complaining about not being able to see. Based on Israel's experience with Asad the father since the disengagement agreement of 1974, there is every reason to believe that his son will also, follow scrupulously an accord with Israel." Indeed, what will make that outcome more likely is if the agreement is fair and equitable. Successive leaders on both sides will not need to justify such an accord, and they will also have vested interests in its preservation. It is an accepted axiom nowadays that no Syrian leader could defend only a partial Israeli withdrawal in exchange for "a normal and comprehensive peace," and that no Israeli leader could justify full withdrawal for anything less than full peace.

Whereas peace provides the ultimate security, Israel will still maintain a formidable military power along with multiple safety valves and security arrangements that will make the reversal of peace counterproductive and therefore unlikely. Future Syrian leaders, be they despots or democratically elected, would have to be insane to trade peace and prosperity for a military adventure that would most certainly destroy their country. In any event, the potential for the rise of a despot who will reject the peace exists in Egypt and Jordan too. Yet this possibility did not prevent Israel from making peace with these two states. The protagonists against withdrawal from Syria conveniently forget that.

The second point that Sharon makes is that "Most foreign defense experts and senior United States army officers who have visited the Golan Heights or studied it repeat the categorical opinion that even in the missile age it is impossible to defend Israel effectively against a ground attack without military control of the Golan Heights." These arguments remain valid as long as Syria is unwilling to make peace. However, under conditions of full and sustainable peace, many Israeli Army generals, including former chiefs of the General Staff, Don Shomron, and Barak attest that the Golan becomes much less relevant. In fact, if Syria is ready and willing to deliver the peace that Israel wants, and the Israelis refuse to offer full withdrawal in return to meet the Syrians' condition, the Golan will no longer be a security asset but a liability. Indeed, what incentive would the Syrians have to keep the status quo of no peace and no war? Another war– if only to destabilize the political climate and possibly wreck Israel's peace efforts with the Palestinians, Egypt and Jordan — would be too tempting and probably only a matter of time.

The third point that Sharon makes is that "No country, including the United States, has ever given up territory and strategic depth just because it had advanced weapons systems or sophisticated early warning technology." To suggest that no territory has ever been given back is simply incorrect. Since the end of World War II, the acquisition of territory through the use of force has become inadmissible and is inconsistent with the international norm of conduct. Israel has had to withdraw from the entire Sinai, which deprived it of strategic depth in return for peace. To compensate for that, Israel has built with the help of the U.S. Two major air basis and further fortified its air defenses in the south but relied mostly on the conditions of peace between Israel and Egypt. In relation to Syria, there is perhaps some justification for concerned because of Syria's past recalcitrant behavior and the Golan's proximity to Israel heartland. A country which that has extolled the virtues of Israel's destruction for four decades, obviously rouses to the Israeli public distrust. The question is, however, what's the alternative? Does Sharon really believe that Israel can make peace with Syria while retaining the Golan? In his article he argues that "Successive American administrations have been committed to the principle in President Ford's 1975 letter to Rabin backing Israel stance that any peace agreement be predicated on Israel's remaining on the Golan Heights." This obviously is not an accurate statement since the U.S. has consistently supported U.N. Resolution 242 which called upon Israel to return territories captured (in the Six Day War 1967) in exchange for peace and secure borders. Both peace treaties between Israel – Egypt and Israel – Jordan were predicated on U.N. Resolution 242. There is not a single compelling reason why should Syria accept anything less. To put it bluntly, it is a highly dangerous illusion to suggest that Israel can have it both ways – peace and the Golan. Four former Israeli prime ministers — Rabin, Peres, Natanyahu and Barak — thought they could exchange peace for peace with Syria, but they all came to realize that only full withdrawal from the Golan can bring peace. This is a reality that Sharon too will have to face.

The fourth point that Sharon makes in his article is that "Israel…must insist that if it is to give up the defensive asset of the Golan, there must be not only a demilitarized zone on the Golan, but also a reduction of Syria's armed forces and the number of its missiles, and a dismantling of its arsenal of chemical warfare." There have been extensive discussions over security matters between Israel and Syria. Many of Israel's security requirements have been agreed to. Barak was directly involved in the security negotiations with the Syrians in November and December of 1994 and in January 2000. He is, therefore, completely aware that the negotiations reached agreements on most of these security issues. Although much progress was made, Syria insisted all along that any security arrangements must be equal, balanced, and mutual; that the security of one side cannot come at the expense of the other; and that arrangements on both sides must take into account the geographic features of the land. The question of demilitarization was basically resolved, provided that Israel offers a credible reduction of its military readiness in the north. The question of monitors was also settled if U.S. or, U.S. dominated forces do the monitoring along with air and space surveillance to provide real time data insuring full compliance by both sides to any agreement. Other more complicated security issues, including weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and general reduction in armed forces were agreed in principle to defer for a later discussion. The problems associated with both countries' possession of weapons mass destruction are not limited to bilateral conflict; they also have strategic regional implications. Both sides continue to be threatened by dangerous adversaries: Israel is threatened by Iraq, Iran, and Lybia; Syria, notwithstanding a temporary thaw in its relations with Iraq, feels encircled by staunch enemies including Iraq and Turkey. For this reason, officials from both sides recognized in earlier negotiation that discussion about these weapons, as a crucial as it may be, must be tackled outside the current negotiating framework. Once an agreement has been attained on all other issues, particularly total withdrawal and normalization of relations, a regional security committee will be formed to review the entire spectrum of issues pertaining to these weapons.

On the questions of reduction of Syrian armed forces and the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon these and other security matter remain subject to further discussion and were all incorporated in the paper Aims and Principles of Security Arrangement which Israel and Syria agreed to in May 1995.

The fifth point that Sharon makes is that "The United States will not rearm Syria with advance Western weapons after an agreement is reached. Such rearming would erode the Israeli ability to deter attack and cancel the Israeli qualitative edge in weaponry the United States has pledged to maintain." The United States commitment to maintain Israel's military edge remains as valid today as it has ever been. President Bush reiterated that pledge again, and it would be highly unlikely that the U.S. would do anything to undermine Israel's military superiority which is part of America's long- term strategic interest in the region. But if Syria needs to modernize its military, would it not be better for Israel if the United States were involved in that modernization effort rather than, say, Russia or France? With military assistance comes American presence and American influence. At the present, Egypt and many other Arab states are recipients of American military assistance and military hardware and the close relations between the U.S. and these Arab countries enhance regional stability and stifle adventurism, especially against another American ally.

The sixth point that Sharon articulates in his article is that "Israel must have control of its water resources, which are of great long-term importance in an arid region where there are already shortages. A third of Israel's water flows from the Golan and could be diverted there, and it must continue to have presence near these water sources." Syria has recognized all along Israel's need for water and has consistently maintained the position that water distribution and future protection of these sources is subject to negotiation. But if Sharon is alluding to a permanent Israeli presence on Syrian soil, it is simply unacceptable to Damascus. The Syrians have always argued against any Israeli presence, be it in the form of early warning stations or soldiers monitoring water supplies. A Syrian diplomat involved in the negotiations rejects such an Israeli presence arguing that: (a) no security or water arrangement should compromise the territorial integrity of either side. ("We do not want to have a Syrian early warning station in Israel and we will not allow an Israeli one on our territory"); (b) tactically, an early warning station could be used for other purposes which could undermine the security of his country; and (c) the need for supplies will create a logistical problem that the Syrians simply are unwilling to put up with. The most compelling objection, however, is that for the Syrians an Israeli early warning station or any type of Israeli presence is a symbol of occupation and a permanent reminder of national humiliation. For Israel, there may be no real substitute for the psychological comfort that an Israeli presence on the Golan provides. But military experts agree that any future water arrangement would necessarily require extensive cooperation involving daily contacts between the two sides. As for Israeli security concerns, there are several viable alternatives to early warning stations including air and space surveillance.

Finally, Sharon raises the problem of the settlers: "It (Israel) is also being asked to bear the painful cost of transferring 18,000 of its own citizens and uprooting 33 communities, deepening already dangerous division in Israeli society. All this for what is at best an uncertain nonbelligerency agreement?" Sharon, like many other Israelis opposed to the withdrawal, invokes the presence of Jewish settlers on the Golan as one of the main reasons not to relinquish the plateau. But should Sharon who is genuinely concerned about "deepening already dangerous division in Israeli society," forfeit an historic opportunity for a comprehensive peace so that the Golan's residents remain, thereby subjecting the whole country to a perpetual state of war and endless sacrifices? As pioneers, the settlers have already played a critical role in convincing the Syrians that only genuine peace might remove them from the Golan. As painful and heartbreaking as their evacuation will be, it must viewed in the context of other alternatives. Rabin was correct when he bluntly stated, referring to then opposition leader Natanyahu, that "It is a deception to argue that Israel can have peace with Syria while holding onto the entire Golan Heights." Barak certainly shares these sentiments, and he too came to the conclusion, even before he became prime minister, that without evacuating the Golan there will no peace with Syria.

One critical issue that Sharon did not discuss in his article is Israel's requirements for normalization of relations under any peace formula. No Israeli prime minister should relinquish the Golan for anything less than full and normal peace. Sharon would be right not to exchange the Golan for a mere "nonbelligerency agreement." More than any other security measure, normalization of relations can create a mutually vested interest in keeping the peace. The Syrians were initially reluctant to offer Israel normal relations, maintaining that it is up to each country to extend the kind of relations it wants, as long as they are not adversarial or hostile. However, Syria came around, through the negotiating process, to appreciate the Israeli position. An agreement between the two governments is obviously a critically important first step, but it will remain hollow if it is not translated into people-to-people relations and honored on a daily basis. What will give such agreement a life and vitality is trade, commerce, tourism, cultural exchange, regional cooperation, mutual investments, and, of course, diplomatic relations. The more extensive and transparent these exchanges are, the more beneficial and enduring the peace agreement becomes. During the on-and-off negotiations between the two parties, there was a definite understanding on most major issues regarding normalization as long as there was a correlation between the timetable of full withdrawal, and the pace of the normalization agreed upon by both sides.

Sharon, who has dedicated every minute of his adult life to the welfare and well being of his country and people, may after all seize an historic opportunity and deliver what his predecessors could not. As committed as he may be to the idea of keeping the strategic Heights under Israeli control, Sharon is also a pragmatic leader who wants to redeem himself by ushering in a new era and bringing peace to his beleaguered nation. In points four and five he clearly alludes to the possibility of withdrawing from the Golan under certain security arrangements. Indeed, there are clearly several salient advantages to turning north and offering to make peace with Syria. First, far fewer Israelis feel an emotional attachment to the Golan stronger than their attachment to the West Bank. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of Israelis are emotionally tired and psychologically handicapped by an abnormal state of hostile existence. National security has become a national obsession. The way Israelis think, plan, and act is framed by the uncertainty that Israel's enemies and the potential for another war impose. The majority of people want to change the national psyche from this state of constant tension and anxiety, which has sapped much of the national energy, to a state of emotional and psychological comfort that builds on confidence and hope. Only a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, to which Syria holds the key, will give the Israelis what they have longed for over a period of two generations. Second, peace with Syria will end, for all intents and purposes, the century-old Israeli-Arab bloodshed and hostilities. A peace with Syria will virtually neutralize most terrorist groups throughout the Middle East, and completely diminish the prospect of another Arab-Israeli war. It will isolate Israel's remaining enemies, such as Iran and Iraq, and prevent them from posing a serious future threat to Israel. Israel has never been in a stronger position, economically or militarily, to take a calculated risk for an historic peace. This prospect offers the Israelis a momentous opportunity to rise above their fears and trust themselves.

Third, peace with Syria will allow Israel to re-channel its national resources and energy toward allocating more money for education, infrastructure, health care and social welfare instead of spending billions of dollars annually on military preparedness to remain combat-ready for the next war. Although Israel will have to maintain a formidable military power in the post Israeli-Syrian peace era, young Israelis, as indicated by former prime minister Barak, could be enlisted in the armed forces for a shorter period of time. This will add millions of productive man-hours to the civilian sector from which both the individual and the state will benefit enormously. Fourth, it is not an exaggeration to suggest that peace between Israel and the rest of the Arab world will become vital, alive and mutually rewarding only with Syria in the peace fold. Without Syria it will, at best, remain cold and lame. Israel will be denied an historic opportunity to reach out to the rest of the Arab world. Instead of establishing trade as well as commercial and cultural ties with Arab and Muslim countries from north Africa to south east Asia, Israel will be rejected and further isolated. Renewed tension with Syria is bound to dramatically slow the flow of capital to Israel. Peace, on the other hand, could make Israel a regional financial center, one of the major economic powers in a global economy. No one understands this better than Israel's business community.

Fifth, Israeli-Syrian peace will inevitably further enhance American-Israeli ties and raise strategic/military cooperation to a new level. The United States has invested heavily in Israel's economic and security needs. In the process, Israel has become a major military power and a critical ally to the United States. Peace with Syria will further enhance a U.S. – Israel strategic partnership, while bringing nearly all of the Arab states into the American orbit. This will change the dynamics of American strategy in the Middle East as well as the future well-being and national security of Israel. The Israelis are too savvy politically to forfeit such a chance.

Sixth, in the absence of peace with Syria, Damascus will be pushed further to create alliances with Iran and even with its perpetual enemy Iraq. Following his father's initiative, the Syrian president is mending his relations with Saddam Hussein and proceeding with the opening of the border for trade with Iraq and the reopening of the oil pipeline from Iraq, closed since the Gulf War. It will be to both Israel's and America's strategic detriment in the region if a new Syria-Irani-Iraqi axis is formed with the view to contain and undermine the Israel-Turkish military alliance that the United States supports. The young Asad is working hard to strengthen his relationship with Russia with the intention of further modernizing his military machine. And while he is talking about peace, he is preparing militarily for every eventuality, which explains the developing of closer military ties with Iran. Peace with Syria will bring Damascus squarely into the American sphere and seriously undermine Israeli and

American adversaries in the region. Finally, peace with Syria will almost automatically pave the way for a peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon. Since Israel withdrew its forces in the summer of 2000 from southern Lebanon, which was certified by United Nations and affirmed by Syria, no major discord left to be settled between Israel and Lebanon. Peace with Lebanon will also end future hostilities between Israel and the Party of God (Hizballah) whose future activity will be political in nature and in conformity with Damascus' wishes.

Bashar el-Asad knows that peace with Israel is not a luxury but a necessity of critical importance to Syria's national well-being. A man educated in the West, who appreciates globalization, knows that he cannot usher Syria into the 21st century while maintaining a state of war with a powerful neighbor and spending more than 50 percent of the national budget on the military. Asad also knows that Sharon cannot offer full withdrawal unless he can deliver full peace with security to his people, and Sharon should know that Asad will not offer anything resembling peace unless he recovers the entire Golan. It is now Sharon's responsibility to tell the Israeli public the truth: (a) that the Golan would not represent a "mortal danger" to Israel under conditions of peace with security, (b) that no peace is possible with Syria without the surrender of the entire Golan, and (c) that Israel's national security depends on normal peace, not on a territory.

Since full withdrawal represents the greater risk to Israel's national security and it is sine qua non for Syria to offer normal peace in return, all security arrangements will rest on the premise of a total Israeli withdrawal with only minor border modifications. As a result direct American involvement is imperative. Historically, no Israeli-Syrian agreement — or, for that matter, any Israeli-Arab agreement– has been achieved without active U.S. involvement. Today, too, no power that both the Israelis and the Syrians trust is better suited or more strategically situated than the United States to become part of the solution. The Bush administration must become a partner in the peace process, the implementation of the peace agreement, and its maintenance. Without such direct American involvement, it is doubtful an agreement can be reached because, in the end, what will separate Israel from Syria is primarily a long-term security arrangement only the U.S. can mitigate.

In earlier mediating efforts in the Middle East, American involvement included major financial assistance. We must continue to recognize that economic security is the pillar on which the national security of Israel and Syria Ð and, therefore, the durability of a meaningful peace Ð rests. Syria will need billions of dollars in economic aid, new capital, investment, and technological assistance so that ordinary Syrians can reap the dividends of peace. As for Israel, it can be expected to ask for billions of dollars in both outright assistance or, at a minimum; in loan guarantees to defray the cost of relocating 18,000 settlers from the Golan, projected at upwards of $10 billion.

Yes, America's price tag for an Israeli-Syrian peace will be hefty, both in term of its security role and its financial commitments. But we can ill afford to do less in a region where we have already invested heavily (time, human resources, money) and where our vital strategic interests are deeply entwined with the political stability and economic prosperity of our friends and allies in the region. As Israel and Syria get down to business, Syria will have to accept a phased withdrawal for no less than a two year period. During this period, the settlers will be relocated to Israel proper while Israeli forces withdraw in a number of phases to the 4 June, 1967 line or there about. As Israel implements the first phased withdrawal, the process of normalization of relations between the two countries will begin. The progress of normalization will be consistent with the agreed-upon schedule of Israeli withdrawal. All security arrangements will be implemented in accordance with an agreed-upon plan. And finally, upon completion of the Israeli withdrawal, full diplomatic relations will be established between the two nations.

Perhaps through an historic fluke or by providence Ariel Sharon has become Prime Minister of Israel at this unique juncture in the life of his nation. Sharon, who has lived through the agonies and tragic losses of every war Israel has fought, is best positioned to deliver his people from the bondage of the past 52 years. Peace with Syria could fulfill the promise of a comprehensive and lasting peace.