Raising the Stakes

The administration may praise the UN resolution, arguing that even a weaker resolution strongly signals international condemnation. But since when has North Korea worried about international condemnation? The truth is that the sanctions will neither have an immediate nor a crippling effect. North Korea knows that China will not allow it to become a failed state and inherit the insurmountable burden of dealing with millions of refugees and possibly millions more starving to death. This is why China and Russia will continue to insist that the situation be peacefully resolved. Pyongyang also knows that by seeking multilateral punitive measures through the UN, Washington has ruled out a military response. In fact, President Bush conceded defeat when he publicly switched from a policy of nonproliferation to one of deterrence and defense. Thus, in his statement after the test, he basically acknowledged that he can no longer seek to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons but will try to deter North Korea from their use or transfer. Pyongyang is also fully cognizant that South Korea, regardless of its internal debate on how to deal with a nuclear North, wants to preserve the Sunshine policy. Seoul is eager to keep the prospect of unification alive and will do everything to prevent a war that could completely devastate it. Finally, although realizing how sensitive Tokyo is about a nuclear North Korea, but obsessed with its historic enmity to Japan, Pyongyang went ahead with its nuclear test willingly risking the loss of Japanese economic assistance in order to assert itself as a regional nuclear power to be reckoned with. In sum, North Korea skillfully capitalized on the divergent interests of the group of five it has engaged with in on-and-off negotiations during the last few years.

The test's aftermath finds North Korea in a much better bargaining position. Washington's refusal to negotiate directly with Pyongyang for the past six years has allowed it to proceed with its nuclear program with impunity. The administration's stubborn insistence on regime change and its refusal to enter into a non-belligerency agreement have given North Korea every reason to defy and successfully defeat the Bush administration policy. Pyongyang has certainly succeeded: there is not even a hint of an American military attack, and to assure the American public, Secretary of State Rice has categorically removed that option.

The Bush administration may choose to be satisfied with the passage of the Security Council's sanctions. But by themselves, they will not force North Korea to the negotiating table nor abandon its nuclear program. Kim Jong-il has skillfully raised the stakes at a time of his choosing: U.S. troops are bogged down in Iraq fighting an ever-widening insurgency in a country that has plunged into civil war; the administration is fighting for its political life in mid-term elections, and Iran has rejected international demands to end its uranium enrichment program, thus presenting another daunting challenge to Washington. To be sure, North Korea has scored another impressive victory in its brinkmanship game with the Bush administration, leaving it scrambling for a face-saving way out.

Six years of failed policy has added another nation to the nuclear club, but one that is reckless, unpredictable, and potentially extremely dangerous. The argument by some administration officials who boast that the UN resolution is evidence of a united, multilateral front agreeing to punish North Korea is dangerously naive. It is critical to move quickly beyond the sanctions because North Korea's first nuclear test hardly signals the end of its nuclear program. Kim Jong-il seeks a functional nuclear deterrent, and this requires more testing of larger magnitude as well as the development of long-range missiles. Moreover, now that scores of countries are involved in uranium enrichment programs the problem of proliferation assumes far greater urgency.

To prevent North Korea from pursuing this dangerously ambitious course, there is an urgent need for long, sustained bilateral talks between Pyongyang and Washington. In this context, the Bush administration must give up the idea of regime change in North Korea to assuage its main concerns and begin the process of building a positive relationship. Only bilateral dialogue will permit Washington to gauge Pyongyang's intentions and requirements and reach a verifiable and enduring agreement. Such an agreement will permanently remove the danger of transfer of nuclear technology and the growing risks of nuclear conflagration in Asia.
North Korea has finally played its trump card by testing a nuclear weapon. In doing so, it has challenged the United States, shook South Korea, deeply alarmed Japan, paid little heed to Russia, and risks humiliating China for a big reward by appearing independent and daring. Emboldened by its own action, Pyongyang will be less accommodating in future negotiations, especially since it has successfully provoked international attention while raising the stakes for the United States, South Korea, and Japan. The sanctions passed by the Security Council are not strong enough to force Pyongyang to relinquish its nuclear weapons. To prevent the situation from spinning out of control, the Bush administration must conduct direct talks with North Korea.

The administration may praise the UN resolution, arguing that even a weaker resolution strongly signals international condemnation. But since when has North Korea worried about international condemnation? The truth is that the sanctions will neither have an immediate nor a crippling effect. North Korea knows that China will not allow it to become a failed state and inherit the insurmountable burden of dealing with millions of refugees and possibly millions more starving to death. This is why China and Russia will continue to insist that the situation be peacefully resolved. Pyongyang also knows that by seeking multilateral punitive measures through the UN, Washington has ruled out a military response. In fact, President Bush conceded defeat when he publicly switched from a policy of nonproliferation to one of deterrence and defense. Thus, in his statement after the test, he basically acknowledged that he can no longer seek to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons but will try to deter North Korea from their use or transfer. Pyongyang is also fully cognizant that South Korea, regardless of its internal debate on how to deal with a nuclear North, wants to preserve the Sunshine policy. Seoul is eager to keep the prospect of unification alive and will do everything to prevent a war that could completely devastate it. Finally, although realizing how sensitive Tokyo is about a nuclear North Korea, but obsessed with its historic enmity to Japan, Pyongyang went ahead with its nuclear test willingly risking the loss of Japanese economic assistance in order to assert itself as a regional nuclear power to be reckoned with. In sum, North Korea skillfully capitalized on the divergent interests of the group of five it has engaged with in on-and-off negotiations during the last few years.

The test's aftermath finds North Korea in a much better bargaining position. Washington's refusal to negotiate directly with Pyongyang for the past six years has allowed it to proceed with its nuclear program with impunity. The administration's stubborn insistence on regime change and its refusal to enter into a non-belligerency agreement have given North Korea every reason to defy and successfully defeat the Bush administration policy. Pyongyang has certainly succeeded: there is not even a hint of an American military attack, and to assure the American public, Secretary of State Rice has categorically removed that option.

The Bush administration may choose to be satisfied with the passage of the Security Council's sanctions. But by themselves, they will not force North Korea to the negotiating table nor abandon its nuclear program. Kim Jong-il has skillfully raised the stakes at a time of his choosing: U.S. troops are bogged down in Iraq fighting an ever-widening insurgency in a country that has plunged into civil war; the administration is fighting for its political life in mid-term elections, and Iran has rejected international demands to end its uranium enrichment program, thus presenting another daunting challenge to Washington. To be sure, North Korea has scored another impressive victory in its brinkmanship game with the Bush administration, leaving it scrambling for a face-saving way out.

Six years of failed policy has added another nation to the nuclear club, but one that is reckless, unpredictable, and potentially extremely dangerous. The argument by some administration officials who boast that the UN resolution is evidence of a united, multilateral front agreeing to punish North Korea is dangerously naive. It is critical to move quickly beyond the sanctions because North Korea's first nuclear test hardly signals the end of its nuclear program. Kim Jong-il seeks a functional nuclear deterrent, and this requires more testing of larger magnitude as well as the development of long-range missiles. Moreover, now that scores of countries are involved in uranium enrichment programs the problem of proliferation assumes far greater urgency.

To prevent North Korea from pursuing this dangerously ambitious course, there is an urgent need for long, sustained bilateral talks between Pyongyang and Washington. In this context, the Bush administration must give up the idea of regime change in North Korea to assuage its main concerns and begin the process of building a positive relationship. Only bilateral dialogue will permit Washington to gauge Pyongyang's intentions and requirements and reach a verifiable and enduring agreement. Such an agreement will permanently remove the danger of transfer of nuclear technology and the growing risks of nuclear conflagration in Asia.