May 13, 2005

The Sadat Option

Right at the beginning of Mr's Bush's first term, the administration declared its intent to review U.S. policy toward North Korea (DPRK) and suspended future talks until the review was completed. The policy review was conceived in an atmosphere of rejection, in principle, of the Clinton administration's engagement policy and inspired as well by the desire for regime change in Pyongyang. In October 2000, after completion of the review, Mr. Bush accused President Kim Jong-II of spreading weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and stated that North Korea should earn the trust of the world. Immediately following 9/11, the administration conveniently linked North Korea to international terrorism. In his January 2002 State of the Union address, the president included North Korea along with Iran and Iraq in the "axis of evil" club. In June 2002, the administration refused to hold bilateral talks and demanded as preconditions to resumption of talks that Pyongyang withdraw its forces from the DMZ, end missiles sales, and allow extensive inspection of its nuclear program. From this point, relations between Washington and Pyongyang deteriorated rapidly, especially after October 2002, when the administration accused North Korea of secretly developing an enriched uranium program (HEU), which the United States asserted was a breach of Pyongyang's obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 1994 Agreed Framework. Later that October, former Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that the 1994 Agreed Framework was nullified, presumably because DPRK had been pursuing the secret HEU program. Based on this, the administration urged the Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to suspend shipment of heavy fuel oil to North Korea, which it did in November 2002. On October 22, the DPRK responded by warning that it will take much tougher actions if the United States continued to use pressure to force it to dismantle its nuclear program, but three days later Pyongyang declared that its willingness to address Washington's concerns if the administration agreed to a nonaggression treaty, recognized the DPRK's sovereignty, and promised not to undermine its economic development.

Although South Korea and Japan urged the administration to maintain the Agreed Framework and not suspend oil shipments to North Korea, President Bush decided to go ahead anyway, and, as indicated, they were stopped. The reaction of Pyongyang was angry and swift: first, North Korea denounced Washington for failing to live up to its obligations under the Agreed Framework. Then, on December 12, 2002, the DPRK announced that it "would immediately resume operation and construction of its nuclear facilities to generate electricity." Nine days later, on December 21, it ordered the removal of monitors from the Yongbyon plant. That was followed on December 27, by the expulsion of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. The conflict further escalated when Pyongyang decided to remove the fuel rods from a storage pond for reprocessing. On January 10, 2003, Pyongyang announced that it will withdraw totally from the NPT, which it formally did in April 2003, thereby unraveling completely the Agreed Framework. In October 2003, the DPRK announced that it had successfully completed the reprocessing of some 8,000 spent fuel rods, adding that it "will consistently maintain and increase its nuclear deterrent force" if the United States did not give up its hostile policies. By November 2003, North Korea's Ambassador to Britain, Ri Yong Ho, informed Reuters that his country possessed a "nuclear deterrent." This escalation can be better understood in the context of the war in Iraq and the DPRK's real fear of U.S. intentions and deep concerns for its own national security. As a foreign ministry spokesman stated in April 2003, North Korea had learned from the U.S.-led war in Iraq and, as such, needed a "powerful deterrent." Throughout this game of brinkmanship, North Korea clearly maintained the upper hand, not only because the administration could not raise the ante by making its threat more credible, but because Mr. Bush was plagued from the start by the lack of a cohesive and purposeful strategy to bring Pyongyang to heel. Whereas the United States demanded "complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement"of North Korea's weapon program and "simultaneous or reciprocal actions," North Korea was insisting on a nonaggression pact with the United States along with a major economic assistance package.

Within the administration, however, there was an intense struggle that prevented the formulation of a comprehensive negotiating strategy, and this resulted in its often sending mixed signals to Pyongyang about Washington's real intentions. A strong and influential group, comprised of the Secretary of Defense, the Vice President, and the National Security advisor, advocated isolating Pyongyang politically and economically while demanding concessions from it, and hoping that the pressure would bring about its collapse. This group was opposed by a faction from the State Department, the NSC, and officials with special expertise on Korean and East-Asian issues, who advocated political engagement with North Korea. Probably having a better understanding of Pyongyang's mindset, this group believed that although coercive strategy has its time and place, it would be ineffective unless the United States first garnered the support of a coalition of states with influence in the region (China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea) which the Bush administration views as the only vehicle by which to engage Pyongyang. Ironically, whereas the administration made the six-party multilateral talks central to its North Korean strategy, there were (and still are) serious disagreements among these nations and Washington on both strategy and desired outcome. In addition, each of these states had its own agenda which was often at odds with that of the United States. Further eroding the effectiveness of the six-party talks was Pyongyang's full awareness of the internal disagreement between the states in the group and Washington, which enabled North Korea to stiffen its position without increasing its risks.

Although China has consistently maintained its commitment to a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, it favors a strategy of incentives and, as a first step, a freeze on further development rather than dismantlement of North Korea's weapon program. In addition, China strongly advocates more flexibility and practicality by the United States. The Chinese, who have not forgotten America's intelligence debacle in Iraq, where no WMD were found, have argued that the United States has thus far failed to provide credible evidence of North Korea's currently processing HEU. More recently, the Chinese have also questioned the validity of U.S. intelligence regarding a "pending" nuclear test by North Korea. Concerned over stability in the DPRK, regional security, and China's own credibility, its leaders are extremely cautious about disturbing the existing order. They reject the use of any force against North Korea and insist that as long as Pyongyang feels threatened by the United States, only Washington can resolve the problem, primarily by abandoning its desire for regime change. Indeed, more than once, the Chinese foreign ministry has accused the United States of being the "main obstacle" to settling the nuclear issue peacefully. Although the Bush administration realizes that China has real sway over North Korea, and is leaning on Peking to use its influence, the Chinese seem to have drawn the line concerning the level of political capital they are willing to invest. In their most recent pronouncement on the situation, they made clear their opposition to any sanctions against North Korea, which means that the Chinese will also object to any United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution, as they have in the past, calling for them.

For its part, South Korea, which stands to gain or lose the most from the unfolding events on the Korean peninsula, has consistently pursued a policy toward the North of engagement and economic integration through trade, investments, and continuing dialogue. In his inaugural speech in February 2003, President Roh Moo-hyun promised to seek peace and mutual prosperity, a continuation of the Sunshine Policy of his predecessor's Kim Dae Jung. Despite the escalating tension between Washington and Pyongyang, South Korea, however indebted it feels toward the United States, has thus continued to court the North, determined not to allow the Bush administration to control the agenda. Many joint projects have been initiated, including railway linkage between the two Koreas and the building of an industrial park in Kaesong, North Korea, for South Korean businesses. And in May 2004, North and South Korea held their first military-to- military talks since the 1950s. Thus, it is not surprising that although South Korea agrees with the United States that the North must end its nuclear weapons program, there has always been a profound disagreement about the best strategy to achieve that objective. Whereas South Korea has sought a policy built on economic incentives that would lure the North toward moderation and eventually lead to reunification of the two Koreas, Washington has continued to advocate isolation and coercion. In November 2004, in a speech in Los Angeles, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun articulated this divergence, going so far as to say, "Pyongyang's desire to develop nuclear weapons was understandable considering the environment they live in . . . that a nuclear weapon program could have grave consequences and that there is no other way than dialogue" Russia, North Korea's closest ally during the Cold War, also does not see eye-to-eye with the United States on the course of action to take toward North Korea. The Russians have been weary of the Bush administration's intrusion in the affairs of the former Soviet satellite states. President Putin has also favored a conciliatory approach toward Pyongyang, one based on economic incentives rather than confrontation. It appears that Moscow, like China, will oppose the imposition of sanctions should the North Korean nuclear issue be brought before the UNSC.

As for the Japanese, although they have supported a mixture of dialogue and pressure on Pyongyang, and in this regard are closely allied with the United States, they still want to avoid confrontation as long as the North Koreans are willing to cooperate. The Japanese feel vulnerable to a North Korea armed with nuclear weapons, as shown by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's traveling to Pyongyang in September 2002 and then in May 2004 in an effort to defuse tensions and improve relations. Historical animosity between the two nations, however, coupled with North Korea's admission that it abducted 13 Japanese citizens during the 1970s and 1980s, have soured relations and pushed Japan much closer to the American camp. That said, with the DPRK in possession of missiles that could hit any target in Japan should war break out, the Japanese are pressing for a peaceful solution to end Pyongyang nuclear weapon's program, promising North Korea economic aid in return while counseling restraint by Washington.

By abandoning the Agreed Framework on the basis of murky intelligence data about North Korea's presumed possession of HEU program, the Bush administration has ignored the real threat emanating from reprocessing plutonium, which would provide the material that Pyongyang could use (or perhaps has already used) for nuclear weapons. Now, with North Korea either in possession of nuclear weapons or within reach of attaining them, and the six-party talks stalled for the past 11 months and not likely to be resumed soon, the Bush administration has basically run out of options. Although in March 2003, the president explicitly suggested for the first time the possibility of using military force against North Korea, striking Pyongyang's nuclear facilities has pretty much been completely ruled out. Military analysts suggest that North Korea will not only be able to retaliate with devastating effect, especially against South Korea and Japan, but an American attack could prompt China's involvement to preserve its credibility and regional prestige. Potentially such an attack could plunge the entire region into a nuclear conflagration. Speaking before the Chamber of Commerce, South Korea's president emphatically stated, "An attack on North Korea could trigger a war engulfing the entire Korean peninsula." A less ominous threat may resonate even less in Pyongyang. On the CNN program "Late Edition" in mid May President Bush's National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley warned North Korea that if it conducted a nuclear test punitive "action would have to be taken" including economic sanctions by several Pacific powers. It is not likely that Pyongyang will take this warning any more seriously than previous American threats. Indeed, any effective sanctions would require the full cooperation of China and South Korea who are expanding their trade and economic ties with North Korea and are on record to oppose any sanctions or quarantine.

Following three rounds of the six-party talks that led nowhere, and considering Pyongyang's success in changing the dynamic of its confrontation with Washington, the administration must now seek a new strategy and re-engage with North Korean. This strategy should be based on the desire of all the nations involved in the conflict to end North Korea's nuclear weapon program. It is high time for the Bush administration to realize that it cannot achieve its goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and still change the regime in Pyongyang. Bullying North Korea has simply failed, and if direct bilateral talks may provide an opening for a resolution to the conflict, this administration must bite the bullet but it can do so with creativity. Perhaps following a model adopted by Egypt's late President Anwar Sadat might offer a way out.

When Mr. Sadat accepted the late Prime Minister Begin's invitation to visit Israel in 1977, he stated in advance of his visit his conditions for negotiating with Israel: full peace in exchange for the return of every single inch of Egyptian territory captured by Israel in 1967 during the Six Days War. These conditions were precisely what he subsequently stated to the Israeli parliament and precisely what Egypt achieved in the peace agreement with Israel in 1979.

Although the Bush administration continues to press for the six-party multilateral talks, it has also stated that bilateral talks with North Korea can be conducted in that context. In fact, on more than one occasion, the United States engaged the DPRK in informal bilateral talks. Since both Washington and Pyongyang need a face-saving way out, the United States could offer to start the next round of six-party negotiations with bilateral talks and then move on to multilateral negotiations. The Bush administration, as Sadat did, should state at the outset that the expressed purpose of the negotiations will be to reach an agreement on dismantling Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program in return for security guarantees to North Korea as well as substantial economic aid. Such an approach would allow China to use its considerable weight with North Korea, which in turn will be hard pressed to reject the new American initiative. At the same time, both Kim Jong Il and Mr. Bush could claim that their own conditions for the resumption of the talks have been met.

This, of course, will achieve more than the resumption of talks because, by accepting the new rules of engagement, the foundations for resolving North Korea nuclear weapons program will have been laid. Washington must give up the idea of regime change and Pyongyang must give up its nuclear program. This is the only acceptable formula to which all of the six-party coalition can agree.

From the start of President Bush's first term until the present, North Korea has won handedly the contest of brinkmanship with the United States. If North Korea does test a nuclear weapon, as intelligence officials who have seen the evidence suggest it will do, the blame for this dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons must be placed squarely on the White House's doorstep. The United States has little leverage left with North Korea, unless the administration changes the terms of engagement by pursuing a different negotiating strategy.

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