Ceasefire: To What End?
An Egyptian brokered ceasefire between Israel and Hamas could temporarily stop the bloodshed, and if it saves the life of one Israeli or Palestinian, is still worth the effort. But a ceasefire which is not followed by a new strategy that leads to ending hostilities permanently will only play into Hamas' hands and undermine the ultimate goal of both Israel and Palestinian moderates. Israel and the moderate Arab states must look outside Gaza to change the dynamic of the conflict. Only a major shift in American policy towards Syria could provide the impetus for a breakthrough.
The argument that if Israel takes certain steps to shore up the Abbas camp by easing the humanitarian crisis, which would demonstrate that moderation pays off while pointing out Hamas' failure to deliver the goods, has some merit. In particular, permitting the Palestinian Authority's security personnel to take charge of the crossings to Israel from Gaza and allow for the flow of goods in both directions will enhance Fatah and undermine Hamas in the public's eye. But, however useful these and other measures may be, they are temporary and will not, by themselves, provide a long-term solution without some drastic action being taken concurrently to change the conflict's entire equation. Leave it to Hamas to take credit for any improvement in the daily lives of Palestinians or to skillfully exploit their despair. Moreover, a ceasefire, whatever the circumstances, allows Hamas to recruit, retrain, as well as amass more weapons, rockets, and munitions and be better prepared for the next confrontation with Israel. This is not a scenario Israel is likely to accept. However enticing a ceasefire may appear, it will strengthen rather than weaken Hamas to the detriment of Palestinian moderates. With a strong religious conviction and determination to liquidate Israel, Hamas as a movement can be weakened but not destroyed. As long as Iran, through Syria, continues to support Hamas with money, weapons, and training, and Egypt is unable to stop the flow of weapons to Gaza, it will be beyond the Palestinian Authority's capability to replace Hamas, and beyond Israel's reach to completely eliminate it as a militant group.
The March 6 attack on Mercaz Harav Yeshiva, an elite religious college in the heart of Jerusalem that killed eight students is more than an act of revenge for the scores of Palestinians killed in Gaza a few days earlier. It represents an assault on a religious learning institution that supports the settlement movement and further underscores the ominous danger of the escalating religious conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Israel and the Arab states have every reason to stem the tide of such developments before they spin completely out of control.
The solution has been staring the Americans, the Israelis, and the Arab states in the face for a long time. But the Bush administration, especially, has remained stuck in its failed policy of attempting regime change in Syria instead of luring Damascus into the peace process. Syria's support of Hezbollah and Hamas is motivated, first, by its special interest in Lebanon and its desire to regain the Golan, and, second, by the benefits, including financial assistance, it derives from Iran. The real culprit is the regime in Iran, which, committed with religious zeal to undermining the peace process will do anything to destabilize the region. Here is where the interests of Tehran and Damascus coalesce. Tehran can do little without Syria's logistical and political support of Hezbollah and Hamas. The net result is Syria holds the key to both groups' fortunes and will continue to agitate the situation in Lebanon and in the Palestinian territories for its own benefit. Thus Damascus and Tehran's collaboration is tactical; it has no long-term strategic value for Syria but will endure as long as Washington insists on isolating and marginalizing Damascus.
It is not too late for the administration to change this policy, especially after the Annapolis peace conference, which Syria attended. But it remains unlikely that President Bush will do so without very strong prompting by Israel and the Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States, along with Egypt and Jordan. Their combined weight in Washington is considerable. Therefore, they must make it abundantly clear to Mr. Bush that if decisive action is not taken immediately, the current explosive situation could end catastrophically. Israel can no longer find comfort with Mr. Bush's dead-end policy towards Syria giving the Israeli government the false hope that it can hold onto the Golan indefinitely. The Arab states know only too well that luring Syria out of Iran's orbit is of paramount importance to both their internal security and to regional stability. They must make it crystal clear that the Bush policy thus far has only strengthened the forces of Islamic radicals, while giving Iran a free hand to undermine the interests of America and its allies. Neither the crisis in Lebanon nor the one with Hamas can be resolved unless Iran is isolated. To achieve that, the administration must deal directly with Syria. Syria is ready to dramatically modify its relations with unsavory groups and with Iran, but this comes with a high price tag. That said, Damascus' wish list, including normalization of relations with the United States, regaining the Golan, and maintaining a special relationship with Lebanon is not extravagant and in any event, may be inevitable.
A ceasefire between Israel and Hamas will not endure unless Syria is on board. With no political backing, limited financial assistance, and reduced weapon supplies, Hamas will have no choice but to live with the ceasefire and adjust to the new reality without being challenged to violently resist Israel.