The Palestinians’ Disastrous Miscalculation

By believing that they could force Israel out of the West Bank through violence as Hizbullah presumably had forced Israel to evacuate Southern Lebanon, the Palestinian leadership have made a disastrous mistake. Their equating Southern Lebanon with the West Bank has given the Palestinian public false hope that persistent violence against Israeli targets will hasten the end of the occupation. Little do the Palestinian leaders know that Southern Lebanon cannot be equated with the West Bank. Indeed, by inflicting indiscriminate and heavy casualties on the Israelis, they have achieved the precise opposite of their intended goal.

Will Palestinian militants wake up to this sad reality and abandon the illusion that somehow Israel will succumb, especially in light of the latest Israeli incursion into their territory and its disastrous consequences for the Palestinians? Or will they continue to fight a losing battle that can only lead to the destruction of what is left of the Palestinian Authority and its infrastructure? Those Palestinians who are convinced that Israel can still be driven out of the West Bank by sheer force should open their eyes and carefully survey how vastly different the conditions are between Southern Lebanon and the West Bank. They will quickly learn that, regardless of the human sacrifices and material losses, Israel cannot and will not simply fold up and leave. Here is why:

First, Israel had no territorial claim against Lebanon and recognized from the start the international Israeli-Lebanese borders to which Israeli forces withdrew in May 2000. In contrast, there is a strong constituency in Israel, although it is a minority, that continues to claim all of the West Bank. Even if it relinquishes much of the West Bank, no Israeli government will ever cede the three blocks of settlements near Jerusalem as well as a significant part of East Jerusalem.

Second, Israelis had no affinity whatsoever with Southern Lebanon; there was no emotional or deeply rooted historic connection. Therefore, they had no interest in holding onto the territories other than for security reasons. The West Bank, however, is considered by all Israelis as the biblical land of Israel; consequently, they feel a profound affinity with it that emanates from a deep historical, religious and emotional attachment.

Third, Southern Lebanon is a piece of land that had for the Israelis a certain security value for a specific period of time, and after eighteen years of occupation it became a security liability rather than an asset. Jerusalem, in contrast, is situated in the heart of the West Bank, where the Jews' holiest shrines, including the Western wall (known as the Wailing Wall), are located. Most Jews, regardless of their religious leanings, feel a special attachment to Jerusalem because it represents their past yearnings, present redemption and future hopes and aspirations.

Fourth, not a single Israeli settlement was built in Southern Lebanon and, therefore, no roots were struck there. Nearly 150 settlements exist in the West Bank, with more than 200,000 inhabitants which requires an extensive security network. Under the best of circumstances, the evacuation of most of the settlements, even as part of an overall peace agreement, would take several years and cost tens of billions to complete. This is not only an awesome task, but one that will provoke a national trauma the likes of which Israel has never experienced.

Fifth, whereas in the north, Israel could quickly build, as it has, a new fence to separate Lebanese and Israelis, the interdisbursement of Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank, especially in Jerusalem, makes physical separation between the two peoples impossible. In this context, withdrawal because of the use or the threat of force is inconceivable.

Sixth, as a candidate for Prime Minister, Barak made clear his intention to withdraw from Southern Lebanon. The withdrawal was meant to be part and parcel of his plan to pursue a comprehensive peace– between Israel and the Palestinians and between Israel and Syria and Israel and Lebanon. The Barak plan did not envision any unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, or in any event, not from the entire West Bank, and certainly never at the point of a gun.

Seventh, even if Israel was forced to withdraw from Southern Lebanon under Hizbullah's guns, no Israeli government could, under any circumstances, repeat the same mistake. Israelis argue that it would be only a matter of time before some militant Palestinian element, such as Hamas or Jihad, resort once again to violence to drive Israel beyond the 1967 borders, with the ultimate objective of liquidating it altogether. As Hamas, Jihad and other extremist groups have made no secret of their desire to eliminate Israel, the Israelis have every reason to take them at their word.

I do not condone Israeli occupation in any form. But to end it, the Palestinians have gone about things in a disastrously wrong way. Only a nonviolent strategy that restores the confidence in the political processes of the majority of Israelis who still believe in peaceful coexistence can work. The vision for a comprehensive solution has been laid out by former President Clinton, the Security Council's resolution, Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah and President Bush. Now the Palestinian leadership must choose between continuing the violence, especially the suicide bombings, which will diminish any prospect of realizing a Palestinian state or restoring political sanity to the equation and so move the Israelis themselves to push for an end to the occupation.