Who Will Be The Next Israeli Prime Minster And Why?
The next Israeli elections, like previous ones , may be greatly influenced by the Palestinians' conduct on the ground, especially by the level of violence against Israel. Under the best of circumstances, the Sharon government in its present composition will not last beyond the end of this year or the beginning of 2003. Who then will be the next Israeli Prime Minister, and why will the Palestinians be unable to exert the same leverage as they have in the past?
Historically, most Israeli governments, especially since the Oslo accords of 1993, were elected by an electorate basically in tune with the Palestinian problem and the prospect of a negotiated peace. Prime Minister Rabin was trusted to deliver peace with security. His assassination in 1955 prematurely ended his efforts and placed Shimon Peres at the helm of the Israeli government. Even though Peres was considered the architect of the Oslo accords, he never earned the public's trust, partly because in his eagerness to make peace, many Israelis feared he might end up compromising their security. Peres called for early elections in1996, hoping to receive a full mandate to pursue peace according to his vision of a new Middle East, but he lost to Benjamin Natanyahu, then the Likud leader and a staunch critic of the Oslo accords. Natanyahu won the elections on the premise that he would deliver the type of peace and security for which Israel yearned. But after three years, most Israelis saw him as an obstructionist, a leader without any definitive plans to solve the Palestinian problem. Therefore, not surprisingly, he lost to Ehud Barak in an early election in 1999. As a former chief of the general staff of the Israeli defense forces and foreign minister, Barak enjoyed high public esteem and was trusted to deliver on his promises. He won a landslide victory, even though he made no secret that it was necessary for him to make sweeping territorial concessions to achieve his national goal. But despite his efforts, the peace negotiations with the Palestinians finally collapsed at Camp David in the summer of 2000. Subsequent efforts to move forward the talks at Tabah also ended in failure. Israel and the United States blamed the Palestinians for turning down sweeping peace proposals that would have granted them a state of their own on most of the occupied territories. The eruption of the second Intifadah in September of that year and the indiscriminate violence against Israelis forced new elections which gave Sharon a landslide victory and a mandate to end the violence and the Palestinian problem. Considering the current political uncertainty, the question of who will be the next prime minster looms large for both Israelis and Palestinians.
A careful review of the Israeli political landscape clearly shows that the Sharon government will not complete its term now is scheduled to end in October 2003. Although the coalition squabbles among the parties in the government may continue, and some coalition partners may go in and out of the government {as recently happened with the Shas party}, Sharon's problems stem more from the imminent departure of the Labor party, led by Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, the current defense minister. Labor has been in a state of disarray since the collapse of the peace talks. Infighting is expected to continue between the ultra liberal wing led by Yossi Bailin, who still views Arafat as a partner in the negotiations–a position held in discredit by a majority of Israelis–and centrists like former Interior Minister Haim Ramon. He has already challenged Ben-Eliezer for failing to build a fence along the green line (the 1967 border) and forsaking the Labor agenda. Foreign Minister Peres, who is known as an opportunist, will be waiting in the wings to capitalize on what may unravel. In addition, Ben-Eliezer is under increasing pressure to quit the government sooner rather than later to give the party more time to reorganize before the next elections. In sum, as a party, Labor does not inspire public confidence, and try as they may to regain power, its leaders may have to languish in the political wilderness for a while or, at best, rejoin a coalition government led by Likud as junior partners.
Notwithstanding Natanyahu's victory in passing a resolution, against Sharon's wishes, opposing the establishment of a Palestinian state during a recent conference of Likud's Central committee, Sharon continues to command overwhelming support by the party's rank-and-file. By all accounts, Natanyahu's "victory" diminished rather than enhanced his standing in the party and the nation. Sharon's popularity, in contrast, is soaring. His approval rating in recent polls, because of the way he is handling Palestinian violence and his principled approach to government discipline, topped 74%. The Israeli people seem increasingly more comfortable and confident with Sharon at the helm, knowing that there is no other leader who can measure up to him; and, in any case, no one else has a specific and credible plan to resolve the Palestinian problem. Pressured by the left and right, Sharon has emerged as a "centrist" who is trusted to making the necessary concessions for peace, including the establishment of a Palestinian state, while at the same time strengthening Israel's security.
It appears that nothing short of a revolutionary occurrence will change Israel's political landscape. In view of changes in the election laws, direct elections for prime minister have been abandoned; the leader of the party that receives the largest number of votes will become the next prime minister. Because of Sharon's growing popularity, the party that will most likely gain votes, especially at the expense of Labor and Shas, is the Likud. Even if, hypothetically, the suicide bombings appreciably subsided or completely ceased, Labor would probably benefit only marginally because of the prevailing calm, but not enough to tip the balance in its favor. In such a scenario the ultimate beneficiary will be Sharon who will correctly claim credit for the improved political atmosphere and the greater sense of security. Therefore, whether the date of elections is advanced, which is likely, or if they are held as scheduled, unless something dramatic happens to Sharon, he will continue to inspire tremendous support and remain prime minister.
Little did Arafat know when he supported the second Intifadah, characterized by the hideous suicide bombings, resulting in the indiscriminate killing and maiming of men, women and children, that it would unite the Israelis and shape the political landscape to the degree that it has. However, it is now up to the Palestinians to try to influence Israel's internal political discourse in a different way by adopting a non-violent strategy. It is the only strategy that can, in due course, reignite grass roots support among Israelis for an equitable and dignified solution. Given such an historic opportunity, Sharon may surprise us all.