Ehud Barak's bolt from the Labor Party in order to remain in the governing coalition has solidified his role as Benjamin Netanyahu's enabler. For two years, Barak has led the Labor Party to irrelevance while facilitating the right-wing policies of the government led by Prime Minister Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman. Throughout this time, Barak said that his staying in the government was in the interests of national security. In truth, his position in the government has served to undermine Israel's national security. His latest move suggests that he will continue to do so. Far from supporting Israel's "Independence," as the name of Barak's new political movement suggests, the continued irresponsible behavior of Israel's Defense Minister will only further intensify Israel's isolation.

Prime Minister Netanyahu has demonstrated through his actions-or more specifically, his inactions-that he rejects the notion of land for peace. This has been clearly illustrated through his reluctant rhetorical acceptance of a two-state solution, rife with caveats, and his refusal to halt settlement construction in the West Bank for even an additional two months in exchange for a doubling of the United States' aid package. Thus, it has become increasingly clear that the framework of Israel's successful peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan based on "land for peace" no longer holds true. This represents nothing less than a fundamental change in Israel's peace posturing in relation to the Syrians and especially the Palestinians. As such, today the prospect for successful bilateral negotiations is not only incredibly remote, but creates an extremely dangerous situation.

At the core of the tensions between Turkey and Israel is their disagreement over Iran. Whereas Israel sees Iran as a major existential threat, Turkey, although purporting to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons, does not view a nuclear Iran as a direct threat to Turkey or even to the Middle East. From the Israeli perspective, Turkey's equating Iran's nuclear ambitions with Israel's latent program, its seeming embrace of Hamas, its efforts to broker agreements that serve to diffuse pressure on Tehran, and its opposition to international sanctions all demonstrate that Ankara has made a strategic shift toward Israel's avowed enemy.

The collapse of the Israeli-Syrian near peace agreement was the most troubling episode that deepened the growing rift between Turkey and Israel over Iran

It is hard to describe the state of affairs of the Arab-Israeli conflict at this particular juncture without using adjectives such as "sad," "unfortunate" or even "tragic," which I think is the most appropriate description. The collapse of the so-called Israeli-Palestinian peace process is indicative not only of the failure of the Israeli and Palestinian leadership, but of the other parties involved, in particular the Arab states and the Obama administration. It is a tragic situation because all the parties seem to focus on political expediency to explain away their failing policies while they lose the capacity show the vision and courage needed to avert the great regional disaster that is in the making.

Any evaluation of Turkey and Israel's national strategic objectives reveals that the perceived policy incompatibility between the two countries is embedded not as much in their objectives of regional peace and stability, as in their assessment of three other geostrategic factors: a) the role and the objectives of other regional players, such as Iran, b) the terms under which peace and regional stability can be secured, and c) the manner in which Turkey and Israel seek to ensure their national interests and remain unchallenged by other states in the area. To better understand the Turkish and Israeli perspectives we must first to look into their national mindsets.

The Israeli government must still approve the proposed United States-Israeli agreement to freeze settlement construction in the West Bank in exchange for a U.S. offer of three billion worth of military hardware, including stealth fighter jets. If Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu succeeds in obtaining cabinet approval, the parties will have 90 days to focus primarily on reaching an agreement on borders. Only an agreement on borders would enable negotiations to proceed by delineating which of the settlements will be incorporated into Israel proper, and which would not. The resumption of Israeli construction would then be limited to those areas that are considered part of Israel proper. The success or failure of the Obama administration's peacemaking effort hinges on whether or not sufficient progress is made to induce the Palestinian and Israeli leadership to continue with the negotiations beyond the 90-day freeze.

The Obama administration is close to reaching a new agreement with Israel that would freeze Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank for a non-renewable three months. Once the negotiations resume, and regardless of the outcome, it will be necessary for the administration to replace Middle East Envoy George Mitchell who led the negotiations for the past two years to no avail.

Two years into the Obama administration, the United States has made important progress in tightening sanctions against the Iranian regime, but more must be done to alter Iran's nuclear ambitions. Despite the new sanctions, Iran has continued to gain influence in Iraq and Afghanistan and stir unrest in Lebanon, strengthening its armed forces all while advancing its uranium enrichment efforts. Today, it is unlikely that Iran views the United States, preoccupied with withdrawing from the region and addressing its languishing economy, as a genuine threat to its nuclear aspirations. Moving forward, the United States must establish a successful Iran policy that underlines the importance of international engagement efforts while at the same time outlines clear consequences for Iran's continued defiance.