It is time for the Israeli government to be realistic with the changing political conditions in the Middle East. The national security paranoia that has defined its policy toward the Arab world is dated, and no longer helps Israel in dealing with its regional threats: in fact, this paranoia is serving only to obstruct what is left of a lagging peace process.

Following the diplomatic breech with Turkey by Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon, Israel has allowed its foreign policy to be poorly misrepresented by ideologues that differ greatly from the majority of Israelis who want peace.

Upon returning from an extensive trip to Turkey these past two weeks, I found my inbox flooded with commentary about the capricious nature of the current state of Turkish-Israeli relations. Many strong supporters of the bilateral relationship from both sides have found themselves questioning the future of a strategic cooperation between the Turks and the Jews that has existed for hundreds of years. A year after Israel's offensive in Gaza drove a wedge between the two governments, emotions are still overriding sound reason, causing what was recently seen to be a diplomatic breach on the verge of crisis. There is no doubt that for this relationship to resume, a series of calculated steps must be taken by both peoples who balance a delicate role between East and West in volatile neighborhood.

What might have been considered a triumphal military feat against the Taliban and al Qaeda in the wake of 9/11 turned out to be merely the beginning of the United States' current dilemma in Afghanistan. The Taliban government's refusal to take on al Qaeda operatives and training camps operating out of Afghanistan brought America's military intervention in 2001. Within a few weeks the war, US forces overthrew the Taliban and pushed al Qaeda out of many of the city centers. The US and its allies were hailed globally for having ousted and largely destroyed one of the most oppressive regimes, and the American public supported what was seen as a fight against those who had attacked their way of life. It is tragic however, that America's initial success was not sustained through carefully planned reconstruction efforts and the building of Afghan military and security to prevent the return of the Taliban and al Qaeda.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be a key test in judging US credibility on the ground, as this conflict has outlived countless US attempts at reconciliation that were too short lived or lacked the political capital necessary to reach an agreement.

The current debate among Israelis about a prisoner exchange with Hamas has been consumed by a narrow discussion of short-term gains and losses for both sides, evading the bigger picture of a future reconciliation between the two parties. It is time for both Israel and Hamas to recognize that there is no escape from one another. The deal that would presumably trade Gilad Shalit, Israel's soldier who was captured in 2006 by Hamas, for approximately 1,000 Palestinian prisoners should be utilized as a precursor for future negotiations between Israel and Hamas. The prisoner exchange offers an opportunity to enlarge the scope of the negotiations and put to end the long and mutually debilitating conflict from which neither side can benefit.

What makes this war unusual and certainly unnecessary was that Iraq under Saddam Hussein never posed a direct threat to the security of the United States. The war was both ill-conceived, and in retrospect, it was also ill executed.

As the continuing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have proved, the brawn or logic of the US and its allies alone will not suffice to create stability in the Middle East. To this effect, a careful cultural and psychological reading of what has moved the Middle East in the past eight years is critical to understanding the crossroads we are at today.

When Turkey barred Israel from a joint military exercise earlier this October, there was a great deal of speculation about the seriousness of a rift between the two allies. Although the strategic relations between the two regional superpowers is critical to both nations it also transcends the bilateral benefits that Turkey and Israel individually derive from it.