Since its capture by Israel in 1967, the Golan Heights has come to symbolize for both Israel and Syria more than an important strategic territory.

The people of the Middle East, Jews and Arabs alike, will remember 1993 as a historic turning point in their long, agonizing struggle. The year 1994 will test the limits of Israeli and Arab perseverance and challenge the leaders to advance creative solutions that defy rejectionism and fanaticism. This year holds both the prospect for great new achievements and the potential for disastrous failure.

Exchanging territory for peace has not always provided the basis for Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations. In fact, for more than two decades Syria has demanded Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights without offering peace in return, and Israel has sought full peace with Syria without ceding the entire Golan. Both parties have accepted the principle for exchanging territory for peace based on UN Resolution 242, but how much territory for what kind of peace remains at an impasse. Since Israel captured the Golan in 1967, both Labor and Likud-led governments have defined the Golan as strategically critical to Israeli defense.

Egypt is in danger of falling into the hands of Islamic fundamentalists. Although the danger is not imminent, it is real. Islamic groups, in and outside Egypt, with the active support of Iran, view the fall of the Mubarak regime as the key to the success of the Islamic revolution.

Egypt is in danger of falling into the hands of Islamic fundamentalists, though not soon. Islamic groups in and outside Egypt, with the active support of Iran, view the fall of President Hosni Mubarak's regime as the key to the success of the Islamic revolution.

By focusing primarily on Israel and the Palestinians in its strategy for peace in the Middle East, the Bush administration is ignoring a third essential player – Syria. Secretary of State James Baker's call on Israel to "lay aside, once and for all, the unrealistic vision of greater Israel and forswear annexation," and his equally blunt call to the Palestinians "to speak in one voice … and amend the Palestinian Liberation Organization covenant and resort to a dialogue of politics and diplomacy" was certainly courageous, balanced, and overdue. Peace will not be achieved, however, without Syria's ultimate cooperation. Syrian President Hafez Assad's self-imposed mission to shape the Arab agenda on the Palestinian and Lebanese issues has often strained his relationships with his fellow Arab leaders and further complicated the Israeli-Palestinian crisis.

For years, the conventional wisdom about the Middle East has been that peace between Israel and the Palestinians was unlikely in the foreseeable future.  

Even before Secretary General Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet leadership had concluded that severing diplomatic relations with Israel in 1967 to placate its Arab clients was a major political mistake. It locked the Soviets into policies and commitments towards their Arab clients from which they could not easily extract themselves.

While the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty continues to affect Israel's political parties, the outcome of the autonomy negotiations will greatly determine the future of any Israeli government. In any case, political parties from both the center and the right now have another factor to contend with — the Gush Emunim (the block of the faithful), which has emerged as a major political force. Since 1967, the Gush has had a dramatic impact on Israel's West Bank policies, and from all indications the Gush will continue to exert political influence disproportionate to its actual numbers. As Israel's general election approaches (November 1981), a new political grouping may be formed, one gravitating toward the establishment of a major right-wing coalition in which the Gush could play a central role.