It has been almost a year now since President Obama set out for Cairo to deliver what has been seen as one of the largest overtures by the US to publicly engage the Middle East. Unfortunately, despite the high hopes that this new administration garnered and the continuous efforts of high level American officials to put an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, there is little fruit to bear on the ground. More often than not, the diplomatic breeches and hurdles to even get to the negotiating table have consumed the headlines, and one year later the multilateral relations in the region seem tepid at best. The repeated failures of the bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians and Israel and Syria may be attributed to a number of factors, including a deep seeded mistrust that has not been addressed, concerns over the long-term security and domestic political constraints to make the required concessions to reach an agreement. Yet while all of these elements contributed to the despondent current state of affairs, the one critical missing ingredient has been the absence of a comprehensive framework for peace representing the collective will of the Arab states.

Much has been written and argued about what Israel can do to effectively address Iran's nuclear program, which Israel views as a credible existential threat. Most Israelis believe that Iran is determined to acquire nuclear weapons and they remain skeptical about the prospect of a diplomatic solution to neutralize the Iranian threat. There is hardly any public discussion in Israel concerning the acceptance of a nuclear Iran, and the question of the nation's course of action is willingly left to the defense cabinet and a small group within the intelligence establishment.

President Barack Obama's meeting with Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Palestinians' President Mahmoud Abbas last September fuelled speculation that there would be palpable progress in the Middle East peace process. Yet so far all attempts at reconciliation have yet to be translated into action.

Through all these ups and downs-and the criticisms that have ensued-one thing remains clear: the dynamics of the US-Israeli-Palestinian axis have shifted and a new momentum has been generated as a result.

Once again, as has happened every spring for years running, the debate over whether the ethnic clashes against the Armenians in Once again, as has happened every spring for years running, the debate over whether the ethnic clashes against the Armenians in the break up of the Ottoman Empire amounted to genocide has made it into the US political arena for Congress to weigh in. The recent resolution adopted by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs-to officially recognize actions against the Armenians in 1915 as genocide committed by the Ottoman Turks-has less to do with the US government's pursuit of historical accuracy, than political theater that has come at a strikingly inopportune time.

It is time for the Israeli government to be realistic with the changing political conditions in the Middle East. The national security paranoia that has defined its policy toward the Arab world is dated, and no longer helps Israel in dealing with its regional threats: in fact, this paranoia is serving only to obstruct what is left of a lagging peace process.

Following the diplomatic breech with Turkey by Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon, Israel has allowed its foreign policy to be poorly misrepresented by ideologues that differ greatly from the majority of Israelis who want peace.

Upon returning from an extensive trip to Turkey these past two weeks, I found my inbox flooded with commentary about the capricious nature of the current state of Turkish-Israeli relations. Many strong supporters of the bilateral relationship from both sides have found themselves questioning the future of a strategic cooperation between the Turks and the Jews that has existed for hundreds of years. A year after Israel's offensive in Gaza drove a wedge between the two governments, emotions are still overriding sound reason, causing what was recently seen to be a diplomatic breach on the verge of crisis. There is no doubt that for this relationship to resume, a series of calculated steps must be taken by both peoples who balance a delicate role between East and West in volatile neighborhood.

What might have been considered a triumphal military feat against the Taliban and al Qaeda in the wake of 9/11 turned out to be merely the beginning of the United States' current dilemma in Afghanistan. The Taliban government's refusal to take on al Qaeda operatives and training camps operating out of Afghanistan brought America's military intervention in 2001. Within a few weeks the war, US forces overthrew the Taliban and pushed al Qaeda out of many of the city centers. The US and its allies were hailed globally for having ousted and largely destroyed one of the most oppressive regimes, and the American public supported what was seen as a fight against those who had attacked their way of life. It is tragic however, that America's initial success was not sustained through carefully planned reconstruction efforts and the building of Afghan military and security to prevent the return of the Taliban and al Qaeda.