Following Israel and Syria's rejection of President Bush's compromise proposal to convene a regional peace conference, a reassessment of the U.S. Middle East strategy and role is critical at this juncture. To break the impasse, the U.S. must develop not only a new stategy but advance a dramatic and comprehensive peace plan of its own that meets the minimum national requirements of the conflicting parties.

When the Middle East peace conference finally convenes, there may not be a Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) representative at the negotiating table. It is not the finest hour in the PLO's long and turbulent history, but it is not a defeat either.

There is no issue in Israel as highly charged emotionally and politically as the future status of Jerusalem. By addressing the question of Jerusalem in the context of the peace process first, not last, the United States could help alleviate Israel's concerns regarding its most critical national requirement.

WITH or without linkage to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Gulf war has galvanized the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and placed it in the forefront of the international diplomatic effort led by the United States. Moreover, for the Arab states, which seem more disposed to peace than ever before, Palestinians' right to a homeland has become central to all Arab policy toward Israel.

ALTHOUGH the Iraqi military defeat has reversed Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait, it has left the Middle East in a state of flux – ripe for either a diplomatic breakthrough for peace or renewed hostilities and violence. For this reason, the United States should immediately pursue a postwar strategy together with its Arab coalition partners and Israel to build a new equilibrium of power and thus pave the way for peace.

President Bush's decision to use force to reverse Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and his reliance on the United Nations resolutions to carry out that mandate have introduced a new balance of power in the Middle East and stimulated the emergence of new alliances. Middle East regional security and a future solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict will be dramatically affected by these developments.

The U.S.-Israel relationship is likely to get much worse before it gets any better. Both the Bush administration and the Shamir government, it seems, have added to the present erosion – only together could they prevent further damage from seriously undermining both the prospects for peace and their long alliance.

Zionism, as a political movement, was the catalyst behind the creation of the state of Israel. Zionism now must help insure the survival of that state. The land of Israel and the Jews' return to that land sustained Zionism, shaping its political agenda and its subsequent implementation. The Israeli-Palestinian crisis over the right to the West Bank and Gaza has so dangerously deteriorated that it now could explode into a full-scale civil war. Israeli leaders currently are asking the same question that faced Zionist elders when the United Nations offered its partition plan in 1947: Should Israel settle for less than the biblical promise? Should the Jews forgo the grand design of Israel for the sake of peace? The Arab nations flatly rejected the partition plan, which provided for a Jewish and a Palestinian state, and invaded Israel in 1948. As a result of the war, Israel expanded its landholdings and maintained them until 1967.

By focusing primarily on Israel and the Palestinians in its strategy for peace in the Middle East, the Bush administration is ignoring a third essential player – Syria. Secretary of State James Baker's call on Israel to "lay aside, once and for all, the unrealistic vision of greater Israel and forswear annexation," and his equally blunt call to the Palestinians "to speak in one voice … and amend the Palestinian Liberation Organization covenant and resort to a dialogue of politics and diplomacy" was certainly courageous, balanced, and overdue. Peace will not be achieved, however, without Syria's ultimate cooperation. Syrian President Hafez Assad's self-imposed mission to shape the Arab agenda on the Palestinian and Lebanese issues has often strained his relationships with his fellow Arab leaders and further complicated the Israeli-Palestinian crisis.