The Likud party's rejection of his disengagement plan represents both a political setback for Prime Minister Sharon and an opportunity for him to strengthen his standing within his party and among Israelis. If the Prime Minister is serious about his plan, as he has repeatedly asserted, t
Prime Minister Sharon's plan, backed by President Bush, to withdraw from all of Gaza and part of the West Bank, certainly falls short of what the Palestinians seek. Even so, the Palestinian Authority (PA) must capitalize on Mr. Sharon's plan.
Israel's late foreign mi
In all probability, neither the first Gulf war in 1991, nor the war in Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein, would have occurred had it not been for our continued dependence on Middle-Eastern oil. Time and again, we have placed our men and women in uniform in harm's way and spent hundreds of bill
Both Israelis and Palestinians are embroiled in strategy built on, and fueled by, fallacy and tragic illusion. Hamas' suicide bombings and Israel's target killings offer both sides an illusion of some gain, but ultimately inflict terrible self-wounds. Thus, the assassination of Hamas
As early as 1994, the late Prime Minister Rabin spoke of the need to separate Israelis and Palestinians by erecting a physical barrier, not only to stop violent attacks against Israel but also to reduce the Palestinians' economic dependence on Israel. But the idea of the fence was reject
The decision of Prime Minister Sharon to evacuate most of the settlements in Gaza and several settlements in the West Bank offers the Palestinians an opportunity to resume peace negotiations with Israel in earnest. Yet for peace efforts to go forward, Mr. Sharon must realize that he cannot h
Peace between Israel and Syria is now more possible than ever because of two factors: One is that most of the issues separating the two adversaries were resolved during their peace negotiations in 2000. The second is that both sides and the United States–whose role remains critical–need a
The Israelis and the Palestinians are fast approaching the precipice. They must either choose to coexist in peace or ultimately face mutual destruction.
The decision by President Bush to speed up the transfer of power to an interim Iraqi government and formally end the American occupation by June 2004 will not put a stop to the insurgency. But it will certainly place at risk the chances for creating a free and democratic Iraq whose governmen