Israel should not wait for the Palestinians to decide when and under what conditions they would resume the negotiations. The time has come for Israel to take the initiative and dramatically alter the negotiating equation.
The resumption of the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, for the first time under the Clinton administration's auspices, and following a five-month-long suspension, presents a challenge and an opportunity for President Clinton to advance significantly the peace process toward a solution. What may come out of the new round of talks, analysts agree, will depend on (a) the readiness of the United States to persuade, push, or pressure the parties to make important concessions to produce interim agreements, and more important, (b) the ability of the US to conceptualize how a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace would look in the face of continuing regional instability. Without such an all-encompassing conception, the US will be reacting to proposals and counterproposals that reflect each participant's separate agenda.
The punitive air strike on Iraqi military installations will certainly not put an end to Saddam Hussein's provocations. But it could be the catalyst for a badly needed United States strategy in the Persian Gulf. The great danger to Western interests in the Middle East emanates from Iran, not Iraq. Combating the Iranian Islamic fundamentalism which threatens the stability of many Arab states, restoring the traditional balance of power between Iran and Iraq, and fostering regional stability, must be the Clinton Gulf strategy. Due to size, composition, and proximity, Iraq is in a unique position to check Iran's export of Islamic fervor. This was the rationale for supporting Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war. The rationale is still valid.
Opening direct talks with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) at this juncture in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations could benefit Israel's short- and long-term interests and provide the peace process with renewed momentum. The United States should encourage such a move and in return bring pressure to bear on the PLO to demonstrate more flexibility. Excluding the PLO formally from past direct talks may have given Israel some room for political maneuverability and some gains in establishing the peace negotiating parameters. The growing strength of the Palestinian Islamic fundamentalists (Hamas), however, the perplexing direction that Israeli-Palestinian bilateral negotiations have taken, and the changing of administrations in Washington all raise a question as to whether Israel's interests and the prospects for peace are not better served through direct negotiations with the PLO.
Syrian and Israeli willingness to negotiate peace on the basis of United Nations Resolution 242 – trading territory for peace – represents a major breakthrough in the long and intractable Syrian-Israeli conflict. Both sides, however, will have to meet each other's national-security and territorial requirements to make peace real.
Until recently, one or more players in the Arab-Israeli conflict rejected United Nations Resolution 242 for one reason or the other. By the time the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) accepted 242 in December 1988, the Israeli government under Yitzhak Shamir rejected any further territorial concessions. The election of Yitzhak Rabin in Israel last June finally restored, after 25 years, Resolution 242 as the main instrument of reference for all future Arab-Israeli negotiations. Even though many aspects are ambiguous, Resolution 242 established the principles on which an Arab-Israeli peace can be erected.
As the Israeli and Palestinian representatives meet this month for another round of negotiations, they should take a much harder look at their people's inter-disbursement on the ground and examine how future demographic developments might affect their relations. This analysis will clearly indicate that only coexistence under separate political authority offers hope for a solution. Here is why:
As Israel this month celebrates the 25th anniversary of a united Jerusalem, the Bush administration should look anew at the Jerusalem "experiment" and its impact on Israeli-Palestinian relations, and utilize it as a catalyst for a breakthrough in the peace negotiations.
Israel should withdraw its request for $10 billion in loan guarantees and resort to other sources to finance the absorption of Soviet Jews. At stake is the United States-Israel special relationship – which could be irreparably damaged as a result of misguided policies in Washington and Jerusalem.