Israel's national security and self-preservation as a democracy, if not its very existence, depend on its ability and willingness to come to terms with the reality of coexistence with the Palestinians on the basis of a two-state solution. Unfortunately, instead of seeking to promote the creation of a Palestinian state, the current Israeli government has sought to impede it. Although Prime Minister Netanyahu's endorsement of the two-state solution at Bar Ilan University last summer offered a good start, it fell far short of the kind of vision needed to achieve a sustainable, lasting agreement. What he and his government have proposed amounts to an autonomous Palestinian entity, lacking territorial contiguity, with ultimate security responsibility remaining in Israel's hands.

When the Palestinian Authority's Prime Minster Salam Fayyad first introduced his plans to build the infrastructure for a future Palestinian state, many Israelis and Palestinians thought of it as nothing more than another Middle Eastern mirage that will leave no lasting impression. A little more than a year later, the plan is showing not only tremendous promise, but has become indispensable to the emergence of a democratic Palestinian state-one living side-by-side with Israel in peace and security.

The now infamous Flotilla incident which resulted in the death of nine Turks has sparked a whirlwind of accusations and provocations between Israel and Turkey that has put the relationship at an all time low.

Regardless of the intended purposes of Israel's blockade on Gaza, the tragic incident surrounding the flotilla has brought the blockade into international focus, and Israel will find itself under increasing pressure from foes and friends alike to lift the blockade in the coming weeks.

It is always easier to assess a situation like the Gaza flotilla fiasco in hindsight. The Israeli, Turkish and European governments and the aid organizations involved have all made a series of grave mistakes, and what we are left with are mores lives lost, no resolution to the blockade, and a tarnished image for all sides involved in this ugly predicament.

This year, May 15th came and went without too much noise, relatively speaking. While the 62nd anniversary of the state of Israel was celebrated with fireworks and praise by Israelis throughout Jerusalem, noticeably absent was Mahmoud Abbas' speech commemorating what is known by Palestinians as the "Nakba" or catastrophe.

Qatar's offer to carry out infrastructure reconstruction projects in Gaza in exchange for re-opening up Israel's diplomatic mission in Doha would have been a positive development for both sides. The rejection of this offer by the Israeli government is both short-sighted and self-defeating.

As the Obama administration is reviewing how to restart the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the depth of its involvement, the parties on all sides of the conflict are looking to see the real nature of the US-Israeli relationship, and whether the current tensions run deeper than what may appear. Although US' and Israel's strategic interests seem to have diverged in the past few months, there is no denying that their ultimate goals for the region are both interlinked and complimentary. While both nations would like to see an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict and have high stakes in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, their problems lay mostly in their miss-assessment of each other's concerns and priorities. But since very little progress, if any, can be made to unlock the Arab-Israeli Gordian knot without direct and active American involvement and a willing Israeli government, the Obama and Netanyahu administrations must demonstrate a better appreciation of each other's shifting strategic priorities. They must now find a way to agree on a modus operandi to end the festering Arab-Israeli conflict and rein in Iran's nuclear threat bearing in mind that time is of the essence.

It has been almost a year now since President Obama set out for Cairo to deliver what has been seen as one of the largest overtures by the US to publicly engage the Middle East. Unfortunately, despite the high hopes that this new administration garnered and the continuous efforts of high level American officials to put an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, there is little fruit to bear on the ground. More often than not, the diplomatic breeches and hurdles to even get to the negotiating table have consumed the headlines, and one year later the multilateral relations in the region seem tepid at best. The repeated failures of the bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians and Israel and Syria may be attributed to a number of factors, including a deep seeded mistrust that has not been addressed, concerns over the long-term security and domestic political constraints to make the required concessions to reach an agreement. Yet while all of these elements contributed to the despondent current state of affairs, the one critical missing ingredient has been the absence of a comprehensive framework for peace representing the collective will of the Arab states.